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ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN DUTCH LAW
Chris J.H. Brunner*
I. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN CIVIL LAW
A. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION
1. The Semantic Question
"Abuse of right" is a contradictio in terminis, if Planiol was right
when he wrote that a right ends where its abuse commences. This statement
is not necessarily correct: it depends on the actual consequences which the
law attaches to the abuse of right, whether abuse of right is equivalent to
acting outside its limits and, therefore, without it. If Dutch law would go no
further than obliging him who abuses his right to pay damages, at the same
time recognizing that he exercises his right, then abuse of right would not be
equivalent to acting without right.'
A survey of cases concerning abuse of right shows convincingly that
Dutch courts deal with abuse of right as a behavior without right. This is
illustrated by judicial decisions which dismiss legal actions, based on an
existing right, on the ground that the plaintiff abused his right and,
therefore, exceeded its limits.
A case in point is the decision of the Amsterdam District Court,
Rechtbank Amsterdam,2 concerning a leaning wall. The neighbor de-
manded its removal on the sole ground that it leaned over his land. This
claim was dismissed, although the court found that the fact that the wall was
leaning constituted a tort and entitled the neighbor to damages. Commen-
tators pointed out3 that the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for demolition of
the wall cannot be explained by the law of torts and was, in fact, an
application of the doctrine of abuse of right. The neighbor could rightfully
complain of the fact that the wall leaned over his land, but apparently his
right did not stretch so far that he could successfully sue for its demolition.
Abuse of right is not just a tort, but is exceeding the limits of the right;
* Professor of Civil Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands.
1. This was pointed out by F.G. Scheltema, Misbruik van recht, W.P.N.R.
(Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notarisambt en Registratie) 3417 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as Scheltema].
2. N.J. 1915, no. 817.
3. Scholten, Uitbouw en bouwen over de erfscheiding, W.P.N.R. 2550 (1918);
Scheltema, supra note 1, at 3419.
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this means that the existence of the right can no more justify the behavior
than would be the case if the right did not exist at all. Abuse of right may
amount to a tort, but this depends on the further question whether the
interests of others are harmed in a manner which is characterized as tortious.
The aforementioned decision of the Amsterdam Court is a good example of
a case in which the abuse of right did not at the same time amount to a tort.4
In Dutch law, as applied by the courts, there is overwhelming evidence
for the proposition that "abuse of right" is an excess of right, instead of the
reprehensible (abusive) exercise of a right.5 Nevertheless, there is wide-
spread agreement among commentators that, for certain types of cases,
"abuse of right" aptly describes what is meant,6 even if the expression may
be incorrect. The Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) has accepted the expression
as a technical term,7 and there can be no doubt that the expression is here to
stay.
2. When the Question Arises
It seems a truism to say that an act not based on a right should be treated
by the law as just that. It is, however, too simple to conclude from this that
the doctrine of abuse of right can and should be dispensed with.
The essence of the doctrine is8 that certain behavior can only be
branded as an abuse of right, when it initially and prima facie appears as the
legitimate exercise of a right. Only in closer examination, when the interests
of others are taken into account, does doubt arise whether what appeared to
be exercise of a right, did not in fact exceed its limits. Therefore, the
question will not arise, when the act is clearly illicit, and where no one
would think of it as the legitimate exercise of a right. This explains why no
cases are found, in the Netherlands or elsewhere, in which firing a shotgun
in a crowded market place was qualified as an abuse of the right to have a
4. The fact that abuse of right is not necessarily equivalent to the committing of
a tort is sometimes overlooked by Dutch commentators. Cf. e.g., 3 ASSER-RUTTEN,
DE VERBINTENIS UIT DE WET 65 (4th ed. 1975); 2 EGGENS, VERZAMELDE PRIVAATRECH-
TELLIKE OPSTELLEN 70, 74 (Alphen 1959) [hereinafter cited as EGGENS].
5. To my knowledge, only once has a Dutch court (Gerechtshof 's-
Hertogenbosch April 24, 1951, N.J. 1952, no. 402) held that the abuse of a right might
give rise to liability in tort, but, nevertheless, should be accepted as the exercise of a
right; see 2 HOFMANN-DRION, HET NEDERLANDS VERBINTENISSENRECHT 94 (8th ed.
1959) [hereinafter cited as HOFMANN-DRION].
6. See HOFMANN-DRION supra note 5, at 95; 2 ASSER-BEEKHUIS, ZAKENRECHT,
BIZONDER DEEL l e Stuk 43 (9th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as ASSER-BEEKHUIS];
EGGENS, supra note 4, at 80.
7. H.R. April 17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89.
8. See EGGENS, supra note 4, at 80, 118.
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gun. In the famous French case decided by the Court at Colmar in 1855,9 the
question of abuse of right, arose, only because Article 552 of the French
Civil Code expressly entitles the owner of land to build on it as he deems fit.
Building a chimney on his house, therefore, was prima facie the exercise of
a right of the owner. Only when the interests of the neighbor were taken into
account and the fact that the chimney was a dummy, obviously intended to
harm the neighbor, was it found to be an excess of the right to build.
The foregoing has two important implications:
(a) The doctrine of abuse of right can be applied, only if the act as such
could prima facie be considered as the exercise of a right;
(b) The doctrine determines to what degree the interests of others must
be considered when a right is exercised.
The function of the doctrine is to delineate the limits of private rights. It
does so by restricting them because of the interests of others, which would
be unacceptably harmed by the exercise of those rights to the fullest extent
that the words of the statute would appear to allow. The revival of the
doctrine in the 20th century shows that in formulating the rights of the
individual, the French Civil Code (and in its wake also the Dutch Civil
Code) overstressed the freedom of the individual to make use of his rights at
his discretion, inasmuch as it underrated the social aspect of the exercise of
those rights, namely, that the interests of others may not be completely
disregarded. Insufficient regard for the interests of others may render the
exercise of a right unacceptable. The real problem is: to what extent should
the interests of others be regarded when a right is exercised.
The doctrine of abuse of right, in its application, determines the social
aspect of private rights. It could, in theory, function also to represent the
socialist notion that rights should be exercised to further the general interest.
In Dutch law, however, the doctrine determines only to what extent the
interests of specific individuals should be regarded, not to what extent the
general interest restricts the exercise of a private right. The general interest
is protected by specific legislation, e.g., restricting the use to be made of
immovable property, but not by the application of the doctrine of-abuse of
right.
B. BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE
The Dutch legal system is essentially an equity system, in the sense that
its rules are intended and construed to promote equitable results. Since the
beginning of this century, the role which equity plays in the law has
9. May.2, 1855, D. 1856.2.9.
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increased considerably.' 0 Of paramount importance in this development,
has been the extension, which the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) gave to the
law of torts: in 191911 the Court ruled that it constitutes a tort, not only when
there is an infringement on the rights of others and the neglect of legal
duties, but also when any act is contrary to public morality or contrary to the
standards of care which must be observed in society, with respect to others
and their goods. By this decision, both ethical and social values were
incorporated in the law of torts. As a result of this decision, the question
whether the immoral exercise of rights or the use of rights with complete
disregard to the interests of others would constitute a tort. It further explains
why traditionally the abuse of rights is treated as a special application of the
law of torts;' 2 this also explains its revival in Dutch law around 1920.
Theoretically, the inequitable exercise of contractual rights could also
be regarded as an abuse of right. However, the doctrine is not applied to
contractual rights because in that area of the law the role of equity, in
determining the contents and the limits of the rights of the contracting
parties, has always been recognized and is expressly provided for in the
Dutch Civil Code. Article 1374 provides that contracts should be performed
in good faith, and Article 1375 that they oblige, not only to what is
expressed in them, but also to what is required by equity, custom, and
statute. Consequently, the exercise of contractual rights in a manner which
is unreasonable and inequitable is contrary to performance in good faith,
and on that ground constitutes an excess of the proper limits of those rights.
The doctrine of abuse of right (at least in Dutch law) is resorted to only
in those areas of the law, where it is uncertain whether and to what degree
the exercise of legal rights is restricted by the interests of others. Between
the parties to a contract, that is not the question, because the interests of both
parties are fully taken into account to determine whether performance is
made "in good faith."
C. FIELD OF APPLICATION
This brings us to the more practical question: in which areas of the law
is the doctrine applied? Contracts are excluded because equity requires that
the rights of the other party are fully taken into account, in order to meet the
10. For an enlightening resume, see Pitlo, De ontwikkeling van eengesloten*naar
een open systeem van verbintenissen in de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad, Ti-
JDSCHRIFT VOOR PRIVAATRECHT 163-93 (1973).
11. H.R. Jan. 31, 1919, N.J. 1919, no. 161.
12. That this, however, is too limited a view was explained supra in text at notes
3 and 4. The tortious use of a right undoubtedly is an abuse of right, but conversely
each abuse of right does not constitute a tort.
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test of performance in good faith. Consequently, the field of application of
the doctrine is considerably limited. A further restriction follows from
decisions of the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), in which certain relations of a
non-contractual nature were held to be relations of mutual confidence and,
therefore, subject to the same test of good faith. This was applied to the
relationship between heirs,' 3 between former spouses with regard to goods
jointly owned by them,' 4 and between the shareholders of a limited
company.' 5 It is now generally accepted that joint owners should exercise
their rights "in good faith," that is, with full respect for the rights of their
partners. 
1 6
This leaves, roughly stated, only property rights (including so called
"industrial property rights" such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc.)
for the application of the doctrine of abuse of rights. What these have in
common is that they, in principle, confer upon their owner the right to use
them as he sees fit and to rely on the law of torts for violation by others.
A survey of the cases in which the doctrine was applied shows that
most of them concern the exercise of property rights. Conspicuously absent,
however, are cases concerning the alleged abuse of movable property. This
fact has puzzled Dutch commentators. One explanation offered is that it is
typical to real property, as opposed to movable property, that its use affects
the neighbors.' 7 An additional explanation would seem to be that the use
which a landowner makes of his land is primarily considered as the exercise
of a right, which is at his discretion, whereas the use made of movable
property is primarily viewed as one of conduct rather than the exercise of a
property right. So, if I use a breadknife to cut the throat of my neighbor, it is
the illegality of the act, and not the abuse of property rights, which is
primarily thought of. This is shown convincingly by the fact that it would
seem immaterial whether I owned the knife or had stolen it. With respect to
movable property, the doctrine of abuse of right is not applied, because its
abuse does not appear initially as the exercise of property rights.
The field of application is not limited to real property and industrial
property. In recent years, the doctrine has found a new important field of
application in administrative law. Following French examples, it is now
accepted law in the Netherlands that public authorities abuse their rights if
13. H.R. Dec. 20, 1946, N.J. 1947, no. 59.
14. H.R. May 9, 1952, N.J. 1953, no. 563.
15. H.R. Oct. 30, 1964, N.J. 1965, no. 107.
16. This is expressly provided in Article 3.7. 1.1 of the Government proposal for
a new Civil Code.
17. See HOFMANN-DRION, supra note 5, at 95; ASSER-BEEKHUIS, supra note 6, at
1977]
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they exercise the powers conferred upon them arbitrarily ("abus de
pouvoir"), or for ends different from those for which they were given
("ditournement de pouvoir"). Especially, the idea that rights are abused if
they are exercised for purposes different from those for which they were
given, has opened a new perspective for the general notion of abuse of right.
Professor Meijers, in his draft for the new Dutch Civil Code, took up
the idea by proposing a general provision to the effect' 8 that a right is abused
if it is exercised for purposes different from those for which it was granted. It
is doubtful, however, whether it can be said of those private rights, to which
the doctrine of the abuse of rights is applied, that they are granted for a
certain purpose. With regard to property rights, Meijers himself explained' 9
that in the law of the Western countries these are not conferred upon the
ownerbecause of the use he will make of them, but because of occurrences
in the past. It is different for legal powers granted to public authorities: these
are conferred upon them to achieve specific purposes. The purchaser of real
property becomes the owner, not because of what he will do with it in the
future, but because he purchased it. In Dutch law, the use which the
landowner may make of his land is restricted in the general interest by
extensive legislation. Within these limits the landowner remains free to use
his land as he sees fit. His property rights do not serve specific ends, but are
at his discretion as long as he exercises them within the limits of the law. 20
The Hoge Raad denied the contention that a trademark was abused
when it was exercised for the admitted purpose of keeping prices high,
although the declared object of the Trade Marks Act was to prevent
confusion as to the origin of industrial products. It was held that there could
be no question of abuse of a trademark as long as it was exercised to protect a
legitimate interest, even if it differed from those which the legislator had in
mind when the statute was enacted. 21
The purpose for which certain rights are granted, therefore, does not
appear to be relevant for property rights, nor for "industrial property." It
18. Article 8 of the "introductory provisions" to the new Civil Code.
19. 1 MEIJERS, VERZAMELDE PRIVAATRECHTELIJKE OPSTELLEN 73 (Leyden
1954) [hereinafter cited as MEIJERS].
20. Cf. DUTCH CIv. CODE art. 625: "Ownership is the right to freely use a thing
and to freely dispose of it in the widest sense, on condition that its use is not
incompatible with the statutes and regulations, made by such authorities which have
the power to make them under the Constitution; and, on the further condition, that
the rights of others are not infringed upon" (translation by the author).
21. H.R. Jan. 12, 1939, N.J. 1939, no. 535; H.R. June 14, 1940, N.J. 1941, no.
109.
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may well have, however, some relevance for procedural rights, which have
been held to serve certain objects.
Summarizing the above, the field of application of the doctrine of
abuse of rights in Dutch law would appear to be restricted to real property
rights, "industrial property," powers of public authorities, and procedural
rights.
D. THE TESTS
In order to determine the scope of the doctrine, it is important to know
what tests are applied to decide whether the exercise of a right amounts to its
abuse; the stricter the test is, the smaller will be the practical significance of
the doctrine.
For a long time, Dutch courts have applied the strict tests adopted in
French law; these tests were also traditionally propagated in the Roman
Dutch law of the 17th and 18th centuries, namely, absence of a reasonable
interest and exclusive intention to harm.
To show that these tests are in the Dutch tradition, one finds references
to the Town Regulations of Tiel of 1659, which provided22 that, by
building, a landowner may take away light and view from his neighbors,
"unless this is done only out of spite or irritation, in order to vex his
neighbor without any profit or interest to himself." Scholtens investigated
old Dutch law, but found no convincing evidence that the doctrine was
generally recognized as part of the law, although its existence was known. 
23
A case mentioned by Van Bynckershoek 24 and decided by the Hoge Raad
on July 31, 1732, comes close to the application of the doctrine, but cannot
be regarded as conclusive evidence that the doctrine was accepted. 25 When
the doctrine was applied by the HogeRaad in this century, initially26 the test
applied was the absence of a reasonable interest. In later decisions, the
22. See VAN APELDOORN, INLEIDING TOT DE STUDIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSCHE
RECHT 36 (8th ed. 1948).
23. J.E. Scholtens, Abuse of Rights, 75 S. AFR. L.J. 39, 47 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Scholtens].
24. VAN BYNCKERSHOEK, OBSERVATIONEs TUMULTUARIAE no. 2713.
25. Scholtens was cited by Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965,980
& n.65 (1975). Scholtens, supra note 23, at 48 concluded: "However, the decision
does cast additional doubt on the correctness of the emphatic statement by
Groenewegen with regard to the non-recognition of the doctrine of abuse of rights in
the practice of the law. The decision of the Hoge Raad as reported by Bynckershoek
leaves the question open."




intention to harm, together with the absence of a reasonable interest, was
mentioned. 27
If there was any difference of opinion between Dutch commentators, it
centered on the question whether the (subjective) intention to harm and the
(objective) absence of a reasonable interest were cumulative or alternative
requirements.28 It was said that the intention to harm cannot be sufficient,
because the exercise of a right may be free from reproach on that account
(e.g., if someone bequeaths his goods to the declared enemy of his
relatives). On the other hand, the absence of a reasonable interest does not
necessarily imply that a right is abused (e.g., if a landowner arbitrarily
admits one visitor and refuses admittance to another).
In those cases, however, in which the exercise of a right was declared
abusive by the courts, the absence of a reasonable interest coincided with the
obvious intention to harm. Article 8 of the Draft for an Introductory Title of
the New Dutch Civil Code provides that the exclusive intention to harm
renders the exercise of a right abusive. But the same article contains a
reminder: certain rights are completely at the discretion of their owners and,
therefore, cannot be abused.
The restrictive manner in which Dutch courts applied the doctrine of
abuse of rights is best illustrated by two cases, which were decided by the
Hoge Raad in 1936 and 1937.
The first, Stolk v. Van der Goes ,29 arose out of a dispute between
neighbors over a footpath. Stolk was denied its use by Van der Goes. In
order to show to Van der Goes that an amicable settlement was to be
preferred, Stolk erected high poles with rags on his land, which spoilt the
fine view Van der Goes had from his terrace over the river Maas. Van der
Goes obtained an injunction from the court ordering Stolk to remove the
poles, as they served no useful purpose and had been erected with the
exclusive intention to harm Van der Goes. Stolk removed them, but then
built a huge water tower on the same spot. However, the tower, consisting
of a water reservoir and an American windmill, was not connected to the
water supply system nor to a well, so Van der Goes obtained a new
injunction for its removal, since the building of the tower was still
considered to be an abuse of right. Its removal was ordered by the court "as
27. H.R. March 13, 1936, N.J. 1936, no. 415; H.R. Dec. 2, 1937, N.J. 1938, no.
353.
28. Scholten defended the view that both were required; see his comments under
the decisions mentioned in note 27, supra, and ASSER-SCHOLTEN, ZAKENRECHT 130
(8th ed. 1945) [hereinafter cited as ASSER-SCHOLTEN].
29. H.R. March 13, 1936, N.J. 1936, no. 415.
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long as it cannot function properly." Stolk did not remove it, but connected
it to the water supply system, claiming that now it served a useful purpose
for the watering of his greenery.
The Court of Appeal held that-even if Stolk now had some use for the
tower to water his land-its erection on this spot amounted to an abuse of
right, because he could and should have erected it in a place where it would
not have spoilt the view of Van der Goes. This decision was, however,
reversed by the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), which held that the Court of
Appeal should have gone into the question whether Stolk built the tower
with the exclusive intention to harm Van der Goes, and whether Stolk had a
reasonable interest to have a water tower on this particular spot for the
watering of his land. The Hoge Raad went on to say that the law does not
require a person who wants to do something which can be done in different
ways, to renounce one of those ways for no other reason than that it would
cause damage to others, as long as the rights of others are not infringed
upon.
A year later, the Hoge Raad3° upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeal, which had reconsidered the matter and had found that the tower,
although connected to the water supply system, did not serve any useful
purpose to Stolk and had been built with the exclusive intention to harm Van
der Goes.
The second case, Teunissen v. Driessen ,31 also concerned a dispute
between neighbors, whose wives were not on neighborly terms. They lived
on opposite sides of a courtyard owned by Driessen, who decided to put an
end to the constant haggling of the wives by erecting a wooden fence ten feet
high at a distance of less than a foot from the windows of his neighbor's
sitting room and kitchen. Understandably, Teunissen complained that the
erection of the fence amounted to an abuse of right, but he was unsuccessful.
The Court of Appeal found as a fact that Driessen had not acted with the
intention to vex his neighbors, but with the sole objective of making visual
contact between the wives impossible. The Hoge Raad, which had to base
its decision on the fact that no malice was involved, held that the erection of
the fence did not amount to a tort, because Driessen was free to build the
fence on his own land as he deemed fit, even if, by building the fence further
away from the neighbor's house and to a lesser height, he would also have
achieved his objective to preclude all contact between the wives, thereby
avoiding or diminishing the harm to the Teunissen family.
30. H.R. April 2, 1937, N.J. 1937, no. 639.
31. H.R. Dec. 2, 1937, N.J. 1938, no. 253.
19771
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What transpires from these decisions is that once a reasonable interest
is shown for the exercise of the right, and if it is not inspired exclusively by
malice, the interests of others may be disregarded. The much broader test
applied by the Belgian Supreme Court32 accepting the principle that among
several possible ways of exercising one's rights, which are all equally
useful, one may not choose that which is harmful to others ("entre
diffirentes fa~ons d'excercer son droit avec la mime utiliti, il n 'est pas
permis de choisir celle qui sera dommageable pour autrui "), was rejected
by the Hoge Raad.
Professor Meijers criticized the narrow view taken by the HogeRaad,
in a lecture given at Louvain University in 1937, 33 and he suggested as
abusive also the exercise of a right, whenever there is a great disparity
between the interests served and the harm done to others.34 When, after the
war, Meijers was commissioned to draft a new Civil Code, he incorporated
the broader test in Article 8 of his Draft for the Introductory Title which, in
free translation, provides:
(1) The abuse of a right is prohibited.
(2) A right is abused, when it is used either for the exclusive purpose
of harming others, or for a purpose different from that for which it has been
granted, or when it is exercised in circumstances in which, taking into
account the interests served and those which are harmed, no reasonable
person would have decided to exercise it.
(3) A right cannot be abused, if its exercise is left completely to the
discretion of the person who has it.
In 1970, the Hoge Raad by anticipation 35 adopted the broader test in
Kuipers v. De Jongh .36 Kuipers had built a garage between his house and
that of Mrs. De Jongh. Before its construction the neighbors discussed the
exact position of the border between their lands, as they had some doubt
whether an existing hedgerow coincided exactly with it. It was their
common assumption, however, that the position of the hedgerow could be
wrong only by a few inches, and they agreed that Kuipers would indemnify
Mrs. De Jongh, if later it would turn out that, by taking the hedgerow for the
32. Cass. July 12, 1917, Pas. beige 1919, 1.65.
33. MEIJERS, supra note 19, at 62.
34. Others like Scholten approved of the strict test; see ASSER-SCHOLTEN, supra
note 28, at 130.
35. See Hartkamp, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: A Survey of its
System and Contents, and its Influence on Dutch Legal Practice, 35 LA. L. REV.
1058, 1087 (1975).
36. H.R. April 17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89.
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border, the garage would be partly on her land. When after the construction
of the garage a survey revealed that it was on the land of Mrs. De Jongh by
about two feet, she demanded its removal from her land. Kuipers relied on
the agreement for compensation, but he was unsuccessful because the courts
accepted Mrs. De Jongh's argument that it was not applicable in this case,
since the parties had contemplated a transgression of the border by Kuipers
for only a few inches, and not for a few feet.
Kuipers, as a further defense, submitted that the demand for the
removal of (part of) the garage under the circumstances amounted to an
abuse of right, as the damage he would suffer by its removal would be
"disproportionately larger" than the benefit which Mrs. De Jongh would
have from it.
The Court of Appeal rejected this defense, pointing out that Kuipers
could and should have established the position of the border before he
started to build. The Hoge Raad upheld the decision, but in doing so
expressly accepted the broader test proposed by Professor Meijers:
In principle, De Jongh is entitled to demand the removal of that part of
the garage which has been built on her land, even if Kuipers acted in
good faith and has offered to pay a reasonable compensation. This,
however, does not exclude the possibility that De Jongh would have
abused her right by demanding the removal of the garage from her
land, instead of accepting a reasonable compensation, in case the loss
Kuipers would suffer by its removal, considered both independently
and in comparison to De Jongh's interests, would be so heavy that De
Jongh could not reasonably have decided to exercise her right to
demand the removal.
Kuipers' defense failed, however, because he had omitted to furnish
information on the basis of which the courts could have weighed his
interests compared to those of Mrs. De Jongh. His submission, that his loss
would be "disproportionately larger" than the benefit which Mrs. De Jongh
would have from the removal, was deemed insufficient for this purpose.
Summarizing the above, it would seem that the question, whether
malice and absence of a reasonable interest are cumulative requirements for
abuse of right, has now been answered negatively. The malicious exercise
of a right always amounts to its abuse; the absence of a reasonable interest
serves only to provide prima facie evidence that malice is involved.
A reasonable interest cannot always justify the exercise of the right.
The interests of others must also be taken into consideration, be it only
marginally. A great disparity of the respective interests can render the
1977]
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exercise of the right abusive, but only if no reasonable person under the
circumstances would have exercised it in this manner. It was pointed out by
some commentators37 that the practical difference between the stricter and
the broader test is very small. Others have suggested that the social function
of the law should be given more weight, by accepting the single fact of great
disparity of interests as the test for abuse of rights. 38
There is a natural tension between the freedom of the individual to
pursue his own interests when exercising his rights, and the interests of
others which are harmed thereby. Also, the general interest makes its own
demands. The balance struck between these conflicting interests differs
from country to country and from time to time. To protect the general
interest, specific legislation has abounded in the Netherlands over the last 50
years, so that the individual's free exercise of his rights has been substantial-
ly restricted. In a densely populated country, such as Holland, legislation
limiting the permitted use of real property understandably takes first
priority. Within the limits set by such legislation, the predominant view, as
reflected in the tests applied by our courts for abuse of rights, remains that
the individual may largely pursue his own interests as he sees them. The
interests of others play only a minor role: they may not be completely
disregarded by the person who exercises his right, but his right comes first
by a wide margin.
This implies that the practical significance of the doctrine is rather
limited.
II. ABUSE OF RIGHTS BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
In recent years the doctrine has found a new field of application in
administrative law which has given it a completely new aspect.
In Dutch law, private citizens have recourse to the courts to claim
redress for torts committed by public authorities. A considerable part of
administrative law, therefore, is also part of the civil law of torts. Our courts
do not give an opinion on the quality of administrative practice, but only on
its legality vis-di-vis private citizens. In principle, the administration may
use, at its discretion, the powers conferred upon it by law as long as it does
not infringe on the rights of the citizens or neglect its legal duties towards
them. The courts decide, if and to what extent, the fact that the administra-
37. See Kbster, De grensoverschrijdende garage, 19 ARs AEQUI 542 (1970);
Wery, Review of Asser-Beekhuis II (9th ed.), RECHTSGELEERD MAGAZIJN THEMIS
264, 278 (1966).
38. See, e.g., ABAS, BEPERKENDE WERKING VAN DE GOEDE TROUW 65 (disserta-
tion Amsterdam 1972) [hereinafter cited as ABAS].
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tion represents the general interest, justifies the infringement on rights of
private citizens or the nonfulfillment of specific duties.
It is characteristic of administrative powers that the law grants them to
the administration for the promotion and protection of specific public
interests established in the law. Our courts have deduced two important
rules of law from this fact. The first is that the arbitrary or frivolous exercise
of public powers is incompatible with the general interest and, therefore,
should be regarded as an abuse of legal powers. The second is that those
powers may be used only to promote and protect the specific interests for
which they were granted; this implies that their use for other ends constitutes
an excess of legal power and, for this reason, is abusive. In developing these
principles, our courts followed largely the rules laid down by the French
Conseil d'Etat, which explains why in Dutch textbooks the French terms
"abus de pouvoir" (for arbitrary government) and "ditournement de
pouvoir" (for the excess of the specific purpose of the powers) are
commonly used. The main difference between French and Dutch law would
seem to be that the Dutch ordinary courts have jurisdiction over administra-
tive abuse of power, if and when the abuse constitutes a tort. Consequently,
the abuse of power by the administration is part of the civil law of torts,
whereas in France it is considered as part of the public law.
How Dutch law applies the two basic rules on the abuse of legal powers
by the administration may be illustrated by the decisions of the Hoge Raad.
In Conscript De Boer v. the State of the Netherlands,3 De Boer sued
for damages in tort, alleging that the military authorities, by lack of proper
care for his health, had caused his disablement. The Hoge Raad held that
the courts may not go into the question whether the authorities had given
sufficient weight to the private interests of De Boer in the performance of
their public duties. How much weight that should be given, in comparison to
the other interests they had to serve, was for them to decide. However, the
disablement of De Boer should be considered as the result of a tort
committed towards him, if their conduct could not in fairness be regarded as
the outcome of a decision-making procedure, in which his interests were
taken into account together with other interests they had to serve. In that
case, their conduct would constitute prima facie evidence of an abuse of
powers, not justified by the circumstances involved.
In Requisitioning by the Town of Doetinchem, ° the Hoge Raad
reiterated that the courts may not go into the question whether the town had
39. H.R. Nov. 13, 1936, N.J. 1937, no. 182.
40. H.R. Feb. 25, 1949, N.J. 1949, no. 558.
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properly weighed the interests of the house owner whose house had been
requisitioned, and the public interest. How much weight should be accorded
to each is for the administration to decide. However, the courts may
intervene if the requisitioning was arbitrary; this would be the case if the
town could not in fairness have decided to exercise its powers. In such a
situation, it must be assumed that the interests of the citizen had been
completely disregarded. However, the decision to make use of its powers
could not be qualified as arbitrary if reasonable people, taking into account
the conflicting interests involved, could have arrived at different decisions.
It appears from these decisions that only the complete disregard of the
private interests of the citizen justifies the qualification of arbitrariness. As
long as reasonable people could have decided to use the legal powers, also
taking into account the private interests at stake, the exercise of the powers
is not arbitrary and, therefore, not abusive.
In Requisitioning by the Municipality of Zandvoort,41 the house owner
did not complain that his house had been requisitioned arbitrarily, but that it
had been done on grounds and for purposes which were not within the
authorizing legislation. The municipality admitted that it had picked the
plaintiff's house for requisitioning because thereby it could put a stop to his
charging excessive rents far above the maximum allowed by law. The
Housing Accommodation Act of 1947 was enacted after the war, when there
was an acute shortage of housing accommodation, with the declared
objective "to promote an efficient distribution of the available housing
accommodation." The Hoge Raad held that the municipality had exceeded
its powers when it requisitioned the plaintiff's house to serve ends for which
these powers had not been granted. Therefore, the requisitioning amounted
to a tort, and the municipality was ordered to stop its implementation.
In a later decision in the same year, Kweldergronden,42 the Hoge
Raad combined the two previous decisions by ruling that the courts may
intervene against the exercise of legal powers by public authorities if there is
prima facie evidence that the powers were used for objectives other than
those for which they had been granted, and also if their exercise was
arbitrary.
These tests for the abuse of rights by public authorities have since been
upheld by our courts, and they determine whether civil law offers remedies
against abuse of right.43
41. H.R. Jan. 14, 1949, N.J. 1949, no. 557.
42. H.R. June 24, 1949, N.J. 1949, no. 559.
43. It is to be noted that recourse against the administration is not restricted to
the application of the law of torts by the ordinary courts. Many acts expressly provide
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Ill. ABUSE OF RIGHT IN CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW
Traditionally, the relationship between the parties in a civil lawsuit is
not treated as one which is governed by the standards of "good faith, " that
is, where the respective rights of the parties are determined by taking into
account the interests of both parties. On the contrary, as their relation is far
from one of mutual confidence, each party makes use of its procedural rights
in its own interest. If the interests of the opponent must be taken into
account, this is done only marginally. The situation is, therefore, compar-
able to that of the exercise of property rights which may be used largely at
the discretion of the owner, so long as he does not abuse them. This explains
how the question of the application of the doctrine of abuse of rights has
arisen in the procedural law.
In 1959, the Hoge Raad4 5 ruled that the appeal by the husband against
a decree of separation had rightly been dismissed as abusive, because it had
been instituted with the sole intention to frustrate his wife's petition, and not
with the objective to obtain a decision of the Court of Appeal on his
objections against that decree. The husband's lawyer had tried to achieve
this by instructing the bailiff to serve the writ of appeal at the latest possible
moment, thereby rendering it impossible for the wife to appeal from a
separation decree which had been granted on the husband's cross petition.
By a mere technicality of the divorce law, the simple fact of the appeal by
the husband, in the absence of a cross appeal by his wife, would have meant
that no alimony would be due by him to his wife. The Hoge Raad, however,
held that his interest in achieving this result, by what was clearly considered
sharp practice, was not an interest which at law should be respected.
It is interesting to note that the abusive character of the appeal was
based on a combination of three grounds: (1) intention to frustrate the rights
of his wife, (2) absence of a respectable interest, and (3) use of the right of
appeal for a purpose that was different from the purpose for which it had
been granted.
for administrative appeals, and those which do not, are governed by the recent Act on
administrative appeals from decisions of public authorities (AROB), enacted on May
1, 1975, and in force since July 1, 1976. As this article is confined to civil law remedies
against the abuse of rights, the significance of the doctrine in administrative law, if
any, is not considered here.
44. Cf. Gerbrandy, Gebruik en misbruik van procesrecht , ADVOCATENBLAD 325,
374,508 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Gerbrandy]. This principle is not undisputed: See
Veegens, note under H.R. June 26, 1959, N.J. 1961, no. 553; and Haardt, Fairplay in
het burgerlijke geding 17 (inauguration address at Leyden University 1958); cf. also
ABAS, supra note 38, at 330, contra, Zeiler, ADVOCATENBLAD 506 (1959).
45. H.R. June 26, 1959, N.J. 1961, no. 553.
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Nevertheless, it is somewhat uncertain whether the doctrine of abuse of
rights adds to the long established principle of procedural law that a litigant
is thrown out of court if he does not show an actual, immediate and
legitimate interest in obtaining a decision from the courts. The principle is
derived from French law and is commonly referred to as "point d'intrt,
point d'action." Although commentators sometimes characterized this
principle as an application of the doctrine of abuse of rights,46 it is doubtful
whether this is correct.
The basis of the principle would appear to be that courts should be
protected from unnecessary litigation. Thus, the principle also applies if
both parties request the court to give an opinion on academic questions, as
for example, what their rights would be under hypothetical circumstances.
Dutch courts have applied this principle independently and separate from
the doctrine of abuse of rights and without reference to it. A few decisions of
the Hoge Raad may illustrate how the principle is applied.
Complaints of misinterpretation of the law by lower courts are dis-
missed by the Hoge Raad if the appellant's rights were not adversely
affected by the decision.47 If a court refuses to hear certain evidence, only
the party who wished to bring it may appeal from this decision, but not the
other party whose rights were not adversely affected by it.48 A bankrupt may
complain in court of the measures taken by the receiver, but only if his
interests are involved. The nature of remedies granted by the law implies
that they are available only to those whose interests are involved.49 A
bankruptcy petition should be dismissed, if the petitioner has no reasonable
interest in the bankruptcy. 5°
There is a connection, however, with the doctrine of abuse of rights, in
the case where the commencement of proceedings or the exercise of a
procedural right is aimed primarily at harming the opponent. Vexatious
exercise of procedural rights amounts to an abuse of right and constitutes a
tort, even if the party using them may have a clear and great interest in doing
so. In those cases, full stress is laid on the impropriety of the exercise of the
right and not on the lack of interest. The doctrine of abuse of procedural
rights would seem to have practical significance, mainly on the ground that
procedural rights are granted for certain specific purposes and, therefore,
46. See, e.g., STAR BUSMAN, HOOFSTUKKEN VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDER-
ING no. 148 (3d ed. 1972).
47. H.R. June 19, 1914, W 9670; H.R. Dec. 6, 1918, N.J. 1919, no. 102.
48. H.R. May 7, 1920, W 10589.
49. H.R. June 13, 1928, N.J. 1928, no. 1379.
50. H.R. Dec. 14,1934, N.J. 1935, no. 95; H.R. Sept. 4, 1942, N.J. 1942, no. 617 .
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are abused if they are exercised for the achievement of other ends. 51
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The doctrine of abuse of rights has been and still is the subject of debate
among Dutch lawyers. Its theoretical foundation, its practical significance,
its scope, and the tests to be applied, are all disputed. A number of books
52
and numerous articles have been written on the subject, and also the courts
have had ample opportunity to express themselves on it. Although there is
still considerable confusion, it cannot be doubted that it is part of the Dutch
law and-to all appearances-will remain so in the foreseeable future.
Several times it has been declared nonexistent or dead, but it always
emerged alive with new aspects and fresh scopes of application.
On theoretical grounds, it may be argued that the doctrine of abuse of
rights is not indispensable for Dutch law, and that by other means the same
results could have been obtained. Even if that were true, it still has merit in
reminding us constantly that moral and social values, accepted in society,
play a role in determining the limits within which legal rights may be
exercised. As such, it keeps law and society together inasmuch as it prevents
lawyers from declaring legitimate the exercise of rights, where ordinary
citizens would see only their abuse.
51. For a comprehensive survey of court cases, in which it may be argued that
the doctrine of abuse of right was applied, see Gerbrandy, supra note 44, at 367 et
seq.
52. WIJNSTROOM, MISBRUIK VAN RECHT (dissertation Amsterdam 1921); OKMA,
MISBRUIK VAN RECHT (dissertation Amsterdam V.U. 1945); HELMICH, DE THEORIE
VAN HET RECHTSMISBRUIK IN HET ROMEINSCHE, FRANSCHE EN NEDERLANDSCHE
RECHT (dissertation Nijmegen 1945).
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